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Abstract
Based on a study of the Indian experience of refugee protec-
tion, the article poses the issue of responsibility as a critical 
counterpoint to the question of power. Power may produce 
influence and power may be an element of influence. But 
how do we relate power to responsibility? Given the domi-
nant discourse of “responsibility to protect” as part of the 
global governance regime, the article asks if there is a differ-
ent way to conceptualize responsibility in the post-colonial 
context. Here the article seeks to make a second intervention. 
Responsibility takes us to the perspective of the margins.
Résumé
À partir d’une étude de l’expérience indienne relative à la 
protection des réfugiés, l’article pose le problème de la respon-
sabilité comme contrepoint crucial à la question du pouvoir. 
Le pouvoir peut être influent ou être un élément d’influence. 
Mais comment faisons-nous le lien entre pouvoir et responsa-
bilité ? Étant donné le discours dominant de « responsabilité 
à préserver » dans le cadre du régime de gouvernance inter-
nationale, cet article pose la question de savoir s’il existe une 
autre manière de conceptualiser le problème de la respon-
sabilité dans le contexte postcolonial. C’est à ce niveau qu’il 
cherche à faire une seconde intervention. La responsabilité 
nous amène à la perspective de la marge. 
Power, Influence, and Responsibility
In any discussion on power and influence in the global refugee regime, one crucial question to emerge from Indian experiences that reflects worldwide post-colonial 
experiences is, What is the nature of this power and influence 
at the margins? This question is important because, unlike 
the Kantian world, the world we live in is characterized by 
a great dissociation of power and responsibility. Wars may 
be launched on countries by great powers, but the burdens 
of refugee flows that wars create are shouldered by countries 
that had little to do with them. Wars in and population flows 
from Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Libya readily 
come to mind, as do the Vietnam War and disintegration 
of Yugoslavia twenty years later, followed by massive refugee 
flows. Millions of Partition refugees in South Asia had little 
to do with the colonial decision to divide the Indian subcon-
tinent. Yet through all these years the global refugee regime 
never questioned this dissociation—primarily for two rea-
sons. First, in the age of democracy, responsibility is under-
stood to rest with the people, who must conduct themselves 
responsibly to prove that they are masters of their destiny; 
in other words, they self-determine, while in reality power 
is exercised by the corporate class. Second, international 
responsibility is exercised by the nation-states, while power 
is vested in transnational agencies and empires who exercise 
power without responsibility. In this situation of graded 
responsibility and the hierarchical history of the notion of 
responsibility, it is important to inquire about the nature of 
power and responsibility at the margins.
In discussions on power, the context of protection is of 
primary importance, for we are discussing how the func-
tion of protection, the ability to protect, a specific mode of 
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care produces power, which is both positive and dominating. 
This article will unravel this dual nature of power. 
Also there remains one more introductory point. The so-
called regime of protection cannot address displacement due 
to war. The present massive refugee flows are not marked 
by mere discrimination or liminal violence, but brutal war. 
The 1951 Convention barely touches the problem. It refers 
to war in the context of the Second World War, or to rule 
out protection to persons accused of war crimes. This is the 
background in which the question of responsibility for war 
and displacement assumes urgency. In war and war-like con-
ditions the categorical distinctions between groups seeking 
shelter, assistance, and protection vanish. In such a time it is 
important to examine the effectiveness of the global protec-
tion apparatus for the refugees.1
We evaluate the responsibility of people and groups by 
how they exercise their power. Sometimes we do this for-
mally, such as in a legal judgment. The question will be, How 
do we relate moral responsibility and legal responsibility—
not only of individuals but of empires, global powers, and 
other collectives? The refugee protection regime has no idea 
of (1) responsible agency, whereby an institution such as the 
state is regarded as a moral agent; (2) retrospective responsibil-
ity, by which a state is judged for its actions and is blamed or 
punished; or (3) responsibility as a virtue, for which a state is 
praised as being responsible. In the context of post-colonial 
experiences, we need a wider view of responsibility in order 
to explore connections between moral and legal responsibil-
ity, and between global and national responsibilities. 
It is only from the margins that the contradictions and 
fault lines in the architecture of power, influence, and 
responsibility can be brought to light, therefore the need 
for a perspective “on the margins” of the protection regime 
is strategic. After all, there are asymmetries inherent in the 
fact that an overwhelming part (by some calculations, 86 per 
cent) of world’s refugees are hosted in the Global South,2 but 
an equally overwhelming part (for instance, 80 per cent) of 
UNHCR’s funding comes from states in the Global North.3 Yet 
we try desperately not to draw the only possible conclusion, 
that this asymmetry means that donors have power and host 
states have responsibility. As we shall show subsequently, the 
expanded mandate of the global protection regime to the 
needs of a wider set of “persons of concern” does not alter 
or significantly modify the wide divergence between the 
root causes of displacement in the Global South and the 1951 
Convention, which remains finally a “persecution-centric” 
approach. Of course, this is not a new point. The question 
first appeared in the discussion in Escape from Violence 
almost thirty years ago.4
This article will therefore examine the dynamics of respon-
sibility at the margin. In this context it will discuss how the 
experience of refugee flows into India since independence has 
conditioned her engagement with the global refugee regime, 
including contradictions in state policies on refugees and the 
policy of giving asylum. The article will argue that the rela-
tion between care and power is not a simple causal one, as if 
simply by caring one amasses power. The relation is complex. 
Care does not simply flow from the sovereign legal authority 
at the top. The heterogeneity of power builds up and draws 
on the heterogeneity of the act of caring. At the same time 
the dispersed state of responsibility orients the power to care. 
This will be the basis of a post-colonial interrogation of the 
global protection regime of refugees and the stateless. India 
not only offers a story of protection and hospitality but is also 
an eloquent example of how post-colonial political power had 
a long reciprocal relation with responsibility.
The Indian Story of Hospitality
The Indian story poses the classic question of how one can 
study the dynamics of hospitality.5 Can it be a policy study? 
Can there be a policy for “hospitality,” a policy to be “kind”? 
Or do we want to study institutions involved in practices 
of care and hospitality? If the state must practise care and 
hospitality and exercise power for the relevant practices, do 
these two functions (providing care and exercising power), 
which appear to be separate and distinct, build on each 
other? From this arises the broader question: from where 
does the capacity to care grow?
In a study of refugee protection by the state, these ques-
tions mean attending to the specific Indian arguments and 
experiences in (1) the definition of the term refugee and its 
scope; (2) the concept of non-refoulement (the principle of 
no forcible return) and its scope; and (3), the administrative-
judicial machinery to determine the status of a shelter-
seeker as a refugee and, once determined, the quantum of 
assistance the shelter-seeker needs and gets.6 It also means 
trying to understand where the refugee features in such 
policy formulation.7 Easy physical accessibility, cultural and 
economic networks, and political support of host govern-
ment and communities are significant elements in refugee 
policy—these are elements that orient care. But they also 
add to the power of the state to decide who will be offered 
hospitality and who will be denied.8 India did not sign the 
Refugee Convention of 1951 or the Additional Protocol of 
1967. In acts of “calculated kindness,”9 some refugees were 
saved, cared, and rehabilitated in this country, while many 
were left out, refused, and neglected in the same period in 
and by the same country.
Refugees from Burma were welcomed as the Second 
World War ended, ignored in the seventies to nineties of 
the last century, and prevented or obstructed from enter-
ing India at yet another point as the new century began. 
Volume 33 Refuge Number 1
43
Similarly, while some groups of refugees such as the Tibet-
ans were almost allowed to be “Indianized,” other groups 
such as Sri Lankan refugees still spend long years in India in 
strictly watched camps. The logical structure of these contra-
dictions and ambivalence in India’s asylum policy has been 
termed “strategic ambiguity.”10 In some cases, as after the 
birth of Bangladesh in 1971–2, refugees returned quickly by 
the thousands, while after 1959 the Tibetan refugees stayed 
and the Indian state did not even attempt to persuade them 
to go back. In contrast, the state according to some wanted 
to forcibly repatriate the Chittagong Hill Tracts refugees in 
Tripura in the 1980s–1990s, and the Sri Lankan refugees in 
Tamil Nadu from the mid-1980s. 
However, such differential treatment of refugees and asy-
lum seekers is not the full history of the hospitality of the 
Indian state. Many writers have chronicled how refugee care 
in post-Partition Punjab and Bengal became part of build-
ing the new India. One chronicler commented, “The his-
tory of relief and rehabilitation in the east is one of gradual 
emplacement within a national body of those who were the 
victims of one of the world’s worst population displacements. 
The travails and trauma that accompanied their emplace-
ment are only reflective of our fledgling nationhood.”11 The 
chronicler of relief and rehabilitation in the West wrote in 
similar vein, “It was the characterisation of the refugee as a 
critical component of nation-building that marked a signifi-
cant shift in conceptualisation and, consequently, in policy 
formulation. Linking resettlement with development, and 
rehabilitation with reconstruction, was a uniquely progres-
sive and far-sighted response to a problem of crushing pro-
portions; in this scheme of things refugees became a valuable 
human resource rather than, only, an onerous liability.”12 In 
contrast Joya Chatterjee shows that it was a time marked 
by the two contending notions of right and charity,13 but 
there is a fundamental agreement among all actors in that 
contentious scenario that we/they are part of the nation, the 
nation must accept us/them. In this dual context of nation-
alism and democracy there is not only a re-emphasis on 
“Partition refugees” as elements of nation-building, but also 
a reinforcement of the state’s duty to care and its imperative 
to mobilize all its powers to that end—indeed, to justify its 
status as the repository of power, the state had to rearticulate 
its obligation to care. The birth of social security was made 
possible by detailed governmental policies and techniques 
for sheltering the refugee population, the expanding uni-
verse of nation, and the daily contest between the state and 
the refugee population that became another segment of the 
population being governed.14
Thus not the security explanation, or the kindness expla-
nation, or even the international law and international 
regime explanation will be enough to make us understand 
the mysteries behind one of the most observed and least 
comprehended political phenomena of our time, namely 
the asylum and refugee care policy of a post-colonial state. 
One may argue that a rights-based explanation may appear 
as the best route, because the refugees of Partition viewed 
their own arrival in India as a matter of right—returning 
home, returning to the “natural nation.” Yet the situation was 
ambiguous (the nation was not so “natural,” and the depar-
ture too was from a “home”), and refugee protection did not 
evolve purely as a matter of right of the refugees, because it 
also evolved as an ethical, humanitarian task involving the 
principle of responsibility towards the subjects of the nation. 
Several accounts of the Tibetan refugees in India have 
shown that refugees are not always a burden; they can be 
creative and productive, and they can add to the wealth and 
colours of life.15 In other instances, refugees became murder-
ers, as the history of the Taliban growth in Pakistan suggests. 
Therefore ethics exists beyond law or refugee rights, though 
one can reasonably inquire as Derrida did, Can one “culti-
vate an ethic of hospitality? Hospitality is culture itself and 
not simply one ethic among others.”16
There are ten main features of major forced population 
movements into India in the last sixty-nine years and the 
responses of the Indian state towards them:
1. The first refugees to arrive in independent India were not 
aliens who needed shelter; they were part of the nation.
2. The first practices of refugee care and administration 
built up not so much through law as through rehabilita-
tion and social security.
3. Institutions are the concrete results of these practices, 
and laws that result in a tradition of hospitality, which 
the state can neither fully endorse nor reject.
4. “Partition refugees” have left a mark on the subsequent 
pattern in which the state has combined care with 
power; this is the mark of ambiguity.
5. The contest between the notions of charity and rights 
that began when refugees started pouring in has influ-
enced the discourse of “hospitality,” a term that is sup-
posed to overcome the contradiction. The current dis-
course on refugee protection in India arises from this 
contest between the two notions.
6. The foundations of the legal-administrative discourse on 
refugees and foreigners were in that strategic ambigu-
ity. Who became alien, when, and declared by whom 
became a deeply circumstantial matter, never to be 
defined by law.
7. Alien-hood thereby became a second part of a demo-
cratic state, which required and created the citizens as 
its political foundation.
8. Because offering shelter and protection became deeply 
circumstantial, including near-permanent residence, 
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local communities responded with charity and fatigue, 
benign care and ill feeling and animosity—a response 
that also characterized the conduct of the state. Local 
response and responsibility influenced state policy on 
refugees.
9. Keeping shelter-seekers in ghettos, proscribing their 
movement, creating penal colonies, thus underwriting 
the nature of charity that the state had been providing, 
become a feature of the asylum and care practices of 
the state, though with some exceptions. What began in 
the Andaman Islands and Dandakaranya continues—
protecting and penalizing have become interlinked 
responsibilities.
10. Finally, the Convention of 1951 was powerless to change 
the state’s decision between visitation and residence. 
Thus, refugees who thought when they arrived in India 
in 1947 that they would go back, did not, and the state 
never told them to go back; similarly, the Tibetan refu-
gees have not been told to go back, nor have they been 
repatriated. On the other hand, thousands of refugees 
from East Pakistan went back as soon as the war of 1971 
was over. Some Chakma refugees flowing into India 
stayed, some went back, and some had to be induced to 
go back. In some cases, the state allowed the refugees to 
come in, then inexplicably shut the door on them. The 
enigma is therefore not so much in India’s non-accession 
to the Convention, but in the way the state defines and 
configures its responsibility. 
Refugee flows to India in time became massive and mixed. 
Possibly it had always been so. The foundational history of 
care in independent India involves countless shelter-seekers. 
Now, the two discourses have become linked—the issue 
of illegal immigrants and that of refugees. Both influence, 
predicate, and prejudice the other.17
Judicial Reasoning
How has the justice system in India responded to this deeply 
equivocal relation? How has juridical reasoning been shaped 
in this context? Drawing from a larger study on this theme,18 
I shall restrict this account to the main features of judicial 
reasoning in India and a few examples.
In a Court decision in India, five Burmese nationals 
detained for entering India without valid documents and 
charged under the Foreigners’ Act of 1946 (hereafter the FA) 
were granted bail by the Guwahati High Court so that they 
could apply for refugee status from the UNHCR in New Delhi. 
Their application was subsequently granted and the case 
was withdrawn by the prosecution (unreported, State v Khy-
Htoonand 4 others, FIR No 18 (3) 89, CJM, Manipur, 1994). In 
another case, an Iraqi national detained for using a forged 
passport was authorized to stay in India and the Court ruled 
that since he had valid certification from the UNHCR with 
him, he could not be convicted for the offence. Considering 
that he was a refugee the Court took a lenient view and sen-
tenced him to pay just a fine (unreported, State v Muhammad 
Riza Ali, FIR No 414/93, CMM New Delhi, 1995). Similarly a 
Sudanese woman who had come to India to escape further 
torture in Sudan, where she had been gang-raped for con-
verting from Islam to Christianity, had been granted refugee 
status by the UNHCR. In this case too, though she had been 
charged under the FA, the Court levied only a small fine and 
imprisonment of ten days already served (unreported, State 
v Eva Massur Ahmed, FIR No 278/95, MM—New Delhi 1995).
In another case concerning a Burmese national who had 
fled to India, had been detained under the FA, and had not 
been able to approach the UNHCR, the Court ordered convic-
tion and rigorous imprisonment for six months and deporta-
tion back to Burma. The Court also ruled that on completion 
of the sentence and in response to appeal, it was not within 
its jurisdiction to hand over the convicted to the UNHCR 
(unreported, State v Benjamin Zang Nang, GR case no 1253 
(1994), ACJM, Sealdah, West Bengal, 1996). 
Did refugees have freedom of movement? A Sri Lankan 
who had been granted refugee status and was staying in 
Chennai was arrested in Delhi for being unable to produce 
a valid travel document, and detained under the FA. The 
Court observed that refugee status did not entitle a person 
to move about freely, found him guilty, and sentenced him 
to six months of rigorous imprisonment (Unreported, State 
v Hudson Vilvaraj, FIR No 583/97, MM, Delhi, 1998). And 
what about refugees who forged passports or travel docu-
ments to take shelter in the country? Almost uniformly, the 
Courts held that such acts constituted offence under the 
FA, sentenced somewhat lightly, and wherever the govern-
ment had pleaded a foreigner’s stay a threat to security, had 
ordered expulsion/deportation, or had said that further 
stay depended on government permission (for example, 
unreported, State v Muhammad Yashin, FIR No 289/97, SMM, 
Delhi, 1997).
And then there was a strange case of perfect ambiguity. 
A woman, arrested on the grounds that she was a Burmese 
national and had violated the FA, produced her birth cer-
tificate, residence certificate, employment certificate, and a 
copy of the electoral roll that listed her as a voter. The Court 
ordered her free on the grounds of evidence, but it won-
dered why, though she claimed to be a permanent resident of 
Mizoram, she could not speak the Mizo language, and found 
it strange that she had an original birth certificate, and had 
been allotted permanent residence in Mizoram, particularly 
when the issue of foreigners was a burning issue in the state 
(unreported, State v Sungenel, GR No 979/96, ADC/Judicial 
Officer, Aizwal, Mizoram, 1996). 
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Thus, the juridical reasoning has assumed that the burden 
of protecting an asylum seeker lies with the UNHCR. This 
includes the burden of resettlement, and the conditionality 
that the detained foreigner would not be able to move out 
to another place of choice without certification and assump-
tion of responsibility by the UNHCR. In such reasoning the 
Court has held that, as much as possible under the circum-
stances, the state should show leniency to offenders who 
had violated the Foreigners Act. It has been recognized that 
not only persecution of a particular person, but a general 
atmosphere of violence and insecurity can also be grounds 
for asking for shelter; and if the state claims that state secu-
rity is in jeopardy, then expulsion or deportation must be 
the norm. The state may not be obliged to grant asylum, and 
the duty of hospitality may not be legally enforceable, yet the 
Court expects that the state will practise hospitality as much 
as possible, based on its own power to determine the period 
of visitation according to particular circumstances. 
Indeed, the Gujarat High Court summarized the posi-
tion (unreported, Kfaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi and Taer Ali 
Mansoon, Civil Rule No. 3433 of 1998) in the context of India 
being a non-signatory to the 1951 Convention:
1. The relevant international treaties and convention are 
not binding, but the government is obliged to respect 
them.
2. Article 21 of the Constitution is enjoyed by a non-citizen 
on Indian soil, implying the principle of non-refoule-
ment, but this does not confer on the non-citizen a right 
to reside and resettle, nor does it mean that if the stay of 
a non-national is contrary to national security, she or he 
can stay.
3. Where the international covenants and treaties reinforce 
the fundamental rights in India, as facets of those rights 
they can be enforced.
4. The power of the government to expel a foreigner is 
absolute.
5. The work of the UNHCR in certifying refugees is humani-
tarian, so the government has an obligation to ensure 
that refugees receive international protection until their 
problems are solved.
6. Finally, in view of Article 51 that directs the state to 
respect international legal principles, the Courts will 
apply those principles in domestic law in a harmonious 
manner, provided such obligations are not inconsistent 
with domestic law.
The Supreme Court has also concurred with the judi-
cial practice of assigning the burden of protection on the 
UNHCR, and has ruled that the issue of “reasonable proce-
dure” in asking a non-national to leave the country arises 
only when there is UNHCR certification of the non-national 
as refugee, and not otherwise. The Court has not laid down 
any standard norm in sheltering or certifying a refugee. Thus 
there is an unwritten division of labour: the UNHCR has exer-
cised its mandate mainly with regard to 12,000 Afghan refu-
gees and 1,000 refugees of other nationalities; in some other 
cases, it has been allowed to carry out relief and settlement 
work; in other cases, the government has decided the fate 
of the shelter seeker. Thus in case of some 100,000 Tibetan 
refugees, and some 65,000 Sri Lankan refugees, the UNHCR 
does not have a direct role. The mandate refugees assisted by 
the UNHCR are Afghans, Burmese, and small number of Ira-
nians, Sudanese, Iraqis, and others. Through the Foreigners 
Regional Registration Office the government issues renew-
able residential permits to mandate refugees on the basis of 
certificates issued by the UNHCR. Yet cases before the courts 
continue involving refugees undergoing legal process for 
illegal entry. Visible and invisible frontiers have been created. 
The feature of these nouvelles frontières is that they are being 
produced internally also; they are not merely vertical lines 
separating two spaces, but concentric circles continuously 
dividing and then locating these lines to rejoin them in the 
universe of the nation. Law, citizenship, rights, obligation, 
and morality—all are caught in this universe of concentric 
circles, where difference and identity both jostled for space 
in the scheme of things.19
Between 1950 and 1975, the Indian government signed 
treaties of peace and friendship with Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, 
Burma, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, and an odd pact with 
Pakistan on minorities. These treaties bore assurances of 
friendship on behalf of an independent and anti-colonial 
state. These agreements were based on and reproduced the 
geopolitical imaginary of an imperial nation engaged with 
territory and population (as in the agreement between India 
and Sri Lanka on the Indian Tamil plantation labour in Sri 
Lanka). Territory was fixed; so also was the attempt to fix 
the population. Like combating famine, combating popula-
tion instability has been a task of great magnitude. People of 
Indian origin who had settled overseas were to give up what 
we might now call a “right of return,” just as partition refu-
gees once nationalized by being allowed to acquire citizen-
ship were to give up the “right to return.” Population flow in 
the understanding of the modern state has queered the pitch 
in the state’s effort to establish a singular and unitary relation 
between place and identity—the hallmark of the modern 
state’s existence. But as accounts of transborder migration 
in South Asia demonstrate, the effort to discount the exist-
ence of people whose identities bear only faint resemblance 
to the professed national identity of the state has proved 
impossible.20
In sum, this discussion shows that judicial reasoning 
(which includes legal reasoning) is the instrument to balance 
power and responsibility, and as the reason it has guided the 
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Indian state to frame its policy of hospitality in a combina-
tion of power and responsibility. Judicial reasoning is the 
congealed expression of the tensions central to the argument 
of this article. 
Stateless Population Groups
We now come to the issue of statelessness. Research in refu-
gee studies tells us that protracted displacement and refugee-
hood leads to potential loss of citizenship in the home coun-
try and, as a consequence, de facto statelessness.21 A serious 
investigation into the conditions of statelessness in India 
will reveal once more the disjunction between the formal 
protection regime led by the UNHCR and the evolving norms, 
conditions, and protection practices.22 The framework of 
protection for the stateless in India is distinctly post-colonial. 
It is derived from the partitions and the decolonization in 
South Asia, where nowhere people abound in the border-
lands,23 and it is at odds with the paradigm of protection 
of the stateless, which emphasizes the requirement that 
the state from where the stateless have come and the state 
they look to for protection must recognize that the groups/
individuals/communities are not their citizens. International 
legal wisdom is therefore inattentive to the ways in which de 
facto statelessness has been produced in the region. Unlike 
the legalistic interpretation of statelessness, statelessness in 
the post-colonial context is seen less as a positive definition—
one that sets out complete conditions for statelessness—and 
more as refraction of citizenship. Citizenship is seen as an 
institution that always “incompletes” itself. Actual experi-
ences of statelessness therefore offer a definition that bases 
itself on displacement of reality—the reality of state, nation-
ality, and citizenship. Not surprisingly then, post-colonial 
research on statelessness is in effect a study of permanent 
incompleteness—a reality that always seems to fall short of 
a hyperreality, and therefore the ideal reality, of citizenship, 
entitlements, legal protection, fully proven identity, recogni-
tions by courts of law, and the avowals by the state.
In some sense this tension was anticipated by the United 
Nations in its early years when it first broached the idea 
of de facto statelessness,24 which is different from refugee 
law. While refugee law is de jure (even when we speak of a 
“refugee-like” situation, because law can be only de jure), in 
the Convention on Statelessness, the law tries to define de 
facto, which is supposedly not de jure. But if the de facto is 
defined or annotated legally, it almost becomes de jure. As 
we shall see, the entire South Asian situation symbolizes this 
tension and thus constrains UNHCR’s activities on stateless-
ness in South Asia.25
Article 1 of the 1954 International Convention relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons defines a “stateless person” as 
someone who is not recognized as a national by any state 
under its law. According to the International Law Com-
mission, the definition of stateless persons contained in 
Article 1 (1) of the Convention now forms part of customary 
international law. The Article defines “stateless persons” as 
those who therefore have no nationality or citizenship and 
are unprotected by national legislation and left in the arc of 
vulnerability. The stateless therefore have no nationality or 
citizenship and are unprotected by national legislation and 
left in the arc of vulnerability. Whether or not a person is 
stateless can be determined on the basis of an assessment 
of nationality laws and how these laws are implemented 
by the state. Since nationality is generally acquired on the 
basis of a link between the individual and the state—some 
kind of connection either with the territory (place of birth 
or residence) or with a national (descent, adoption, or mar-
riage)—it is therefore held important to look at the national-
ity legislation and practice of states with which an individual 
enjoys a link in order to see if nationality is attributed to 
the individual under any state’s law. If not, then he or she 
is stateless. Yet we must understand that the law on state-
lessness is heavily influenced by the European experiences 
of succession of states and does not take into account the 
post-colonial experiences of partitions and decolonization. 
Thus the UNHCR finds it difficult to understand the de facto 
stateless nature of several population groups in India, such 
as the Chakmas in Arunachal Pradesh, who were encour-
aged by the Government of India to take shelter in the deso-
late North East Frontier Agency (now Arunachal Pradesh), 
India, when they were uprooted from Chittagong Hill Tracts, 
Bangladesh (erstwhile East Pakistan) after the building of 
Kaptai Dam in 1964. 
Let us go back once more to the 1954 International Con-
vention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. It refers 
to the category of  de facto  stateless persons—who remain 
outside the country of their nationality and hence are unable 
unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that coun-
try. “Protection” in this context refers to the right to diplo-
matic protection exercisable by a state of nationality in order 
to remedy an internationally wrongful act against one of 
its nationals, as well as diplomatic and consular protection 
and assistance, generally including her return to the state of 
nationality. Again, Article 15 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights says, “Everyone has a nationality. No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality, nor the right 
to change his nationality.” It implies, first, that one cannot 
have the option of remaining stateless, and second, depriva-
tion of nationality or denial of the right to nationality is pos-
sible, provided it is not “arbitrary.” International law empow-
ers the state to determine who are its citizens. The operation 
of law must be in accordance with the principles established 
by international law. 
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On the basis of South Asian experiences, one can argue 
that while statelessness may emerge from succession of states 
or territorial reorganizations, it can also emerge from per-
secution of minorities due to a state’s majoritarian bias and 
consequent disenfranchisement, which may lead to expulsion 
of groups of inhabitants. This condition, reinforced by the 
protracted refusal of the involved states to take them back, 
may lead to loss of their nationality and citizenship. A classic 
emergence of a stateless population is that of the Rohingyas in 
Bangladesh and India. While residents of border enclaves did 
not strictly fall into the category of the stateless, they were 
subject to harsh border control practices and regulations, that 
negated their formal citizenship. On the other hand, Hindu 
refugees from Pakistan and Tamils of Indian origin continue 
to live in the camps of Tamil Nadu and are yet to be granted 
citizenship. Together they illustrate the prevalence of de facto 
statelessness in the post-colonial world. But statelessness is 
not simply a legal problem or a humanitarian problem; it is 
a political problem as well. Can pure legal mechanisms work 
in such a complex situation? Is it adequate to look upon 
statelessness simply as an interstate problem? Suffice it to say 
that dialogue with the UNHCR has proven ineffective in the 
face of UNHCR’s absolute disregard for the de facto stateless 
situation in South Asia, its complexity, and the political-
administrative-juridical practices of the state with regard to 
these groups.26 There is a need to study the judicial, adminis-
trative, and political decisions of the Indian state to host these 
groups within the confines set by the Citizenship Act (1955), 
Foreigners Act (1946), and measures regarding the aliens in 
the British statutes applicable to India (the British Nationality 
and Status of Aliens Act, 1914).27
Statelessness seen in this light is more a set of conditions 
that limit experience. Such an understanding must at one 
point brush against the law. The function of international law 
is to tell society the limits of institutions such as border, state, 
citizenship, rights, humanitarianism, and constitution. If the 
subject of the state is the citizen, the stateless is the alien.
The study of stateless populations will become increasingly 
significant in forced migration studies. As states go to war, 
rise, and fall, countries fight new forms of colonialism and 
new forms of decolonization occur, borders and boundaries 
play havoc with settled configurations, the number of state-
less population groups will increase. We may see a reduction 
of de jure statelessness, but a rise in de facto stateless popula-
tions around the world. It may also become increasingly dif-
ficult to distinguish between a refugee group and a stateless 
group. Newer identity practices imposed by states may pro-
duce stateless condition. If the preceding century was one of 
partitions, this century may become known as the century of 
stateless people marked by diverse state practices. 
Concluding Observations
Let us now connect the threads in this article by revisiting the 
main argument, that the other scene of power and influence 
in the global refugee regime is that of power and responsibil-
ity at the margins. Too often we focus on the global regime 
of power and influence that mark the protection regime, 
while ignoring the dynamics of responsibility that mark the 
protection scenario at the margins. As a result our critique 
too has suffered from a top-down approach. Posing from 
the margins the question of responsibility is a post-colonial 
reflection of the way power is organized. In that sense the 
question posed in the article has a broader significance, for 
the implication is that we must examine the dynamics of 
responsibility whenever we study power. 
The post-colonial framing of responsibility will mean 
taking into account the background of decolonization, parti-
tions, structural reforms, environmental disasters, and neo-
liberal development against which population flows con-
tinue. The article has argued that against this background of 
continuing population movements, the legal definitions of 
the victims of forced migration and their protection norms 
are starkly inadequate. Because this is the postcolonial real-
ity, it is important to study the local dynamics of power and 
responsibility in protection of the victims of forced migra-
tion. This article argues that we need to study local and 
variegated experiences of refugee protection, because there 
is a greater burden of protection at the micro level—at the 
margin. 
One may argue that the power and influence of the global 
refugee regime is largely ineffective against the realities of 
the post-colonial world. The migrant has emerged as a sig-
nificant subject28 under conditions of globalization, aggres-
sive wars, transgression of borders, and a political economy 
that allows differential inclusion of migrant labour. But if 
the post-colonial experiences suggest plural responsibilities 
for protection and hospitality, it means that we must accept 
legal pluralism as the foundational principle for rebuilding 
the architecture of protection.29
While not all post-colonial experiences are the same, the 
article suggests that the Indian experience is indicative of a 
general experience and problematizes assumptions about 
the experience of states on the margins of the international 
system.
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